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WHY CHRISTIANS SHOULD NOT BE LIBERTARIANS:
AN AUGUSTINIAN CHALLENGE
Lynne Rudder Baker
The prevailing view of Christian philosophers today seems to be that
Christianity requires a libertarian conception of free will. Focusing on
Augustine's mature anti-Pelagian works, I try to show that the prevailing view
is in error. Specifically, I want to show that---{)n Augustine's view of grace-a
libertarian account of free will is irrelevant to salvation. On Augustine's view,
the grace of God through Christ is sufficient as weIl as necessary for salvation.
Salvation is entirely in the hands of God, totally independent of anything that
any human being might do. And faith, the human response to salvation, is best
understood in terms of a compatibilist account of freedom.
1. The Philosophical Consensus Today
A surprising number of Christian philosophers today take it to be obvi-
ous that human beings have free will as libertarians construe it. Not only
do they take us to have free will, but they also take a libertarian conception
of free will to be important for Christian practice and theology. For exam-
pIe, Linda Zagzebski has spoken of the belief /fthat human beings have free
will in a sense of 'free' that is incompatible with determinism" as "central to
Christian practice."l And Alvin Plantinga has appealed to a libertarian con-
ception of free will in his treatment of the theological problem of evil. He
defends his use of the view that we have libertarian free will by saying, /fIt
seems to me altogether paradoxical to say of anyone all of whose actions are
causally determined that on some occasions he acts freely."2
Let us say that an account of free will is libertarian if and only if it entails
that a condition of a person S's having free will with respect to an action (or
choice) A is that A is not ultimately caused by factors outside of S's control.
Let us say that an account of free will is compatibilist if and only if it entails
that a person S's having free will with respect to an action (or choice) A is
compatible with the A's being caused ultimately by factors outside of S's
control. Although compatibilist accounts of free will are compatible with
the truth of determinism, and libertarian accounts of free will are not, the
deeper difference between compatibilist and libertarian accounts is the kind
of control atlribtlted to an agent who acts (or chooses) freely.
On a compatibilist conception of free will, a will can be caused and still
be free in the sense required for moral responsibility. Some kinds of causes
(e.g., coercion, physical manipulation) block exercise of a compatibilist free
will, but others (e.g., having one's will caused by adesire that one wants to
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have) do not. Proponents of compatibilist accounts of free will allow that
a will may be free even if it is caused by God or by natural events to choose
or decide what it does.3 The important point of difference between liber-
tarian and compatibilist accounts of free will is this: Can a will be free if it
is caused to choose or do what it does by factors beyond the agent's con-
trol? Compatibilists say yes, such a will can be free; libertarians say no,
such a will cannot be free. The Augustinian challenge is to free will as the
libertarians construe it, not to free will as the compatibilists construe it.
In the Christian tradition, the debates have tended to focus on what con-
stitutes free will. For example, in his The Freedom of the Will, Jonathan
Edwards argued (convincingly, to me) that our wills are free in what today
would be called a compatibilist way. On the other hand, in his On the
Bondage of the Will, Martin Luther understood the term 'free will' in what
today we would call a libertarian way, and he argued vociferously that we
do not have such free will. By and large, however, the debate has been
framed in terms of what free will is, on the assumption that human
beings-unlike, e.g., the wind-have free will.
One further complication: The topic of causation is vexed. Although I
cannot give a philosophically worthy account of causation, I want to
appeal to the idea of 'producing' or 'bringing abollt.' A cause produces or
brings about its effect in the given circumstances. "In the given circum-
stances" is intended to cover background conditions-conditions neces-
sary for the occurrence of the caused event that are already in place before
the cause comes along. (E.g., the assassin is at the same location as the vic-
tim right before the assassination.)
The fact that some Christians believe in libertarian accounts of free will
is not surprising: Molinists, Arminians, and Free-Will Baptists, explicitly
endorse doctrines of libertarian free will. What is astonishing is that
almost all contemporary Christian philosophers, even those who see them-
selves in the Protestant and Reformed traditions of Luther and Calvin, also
affirm free will as libertarians construe it (hereafter 'libertarian free will').
They consider it an advantage that their Christian views entail that a liber-
tarian account of free will is true.
What is surprising is the apparent Christian consensus on free will. The
apparent consensus is surprising for two reasons. First, rejection of libertar-
ian accounts of free will would make the solutions to certain philosophical
problems for Christians very easy. We could understand the doctrine of
divine providence in the traditional way: Everything in the universe,
including our free actions and choices, is under God's sovereignty. Also,
we could almost effortlessly solve the problem of the compatibility of free-
dom and foreknowledge: If there is a causal nexus that govems all events
(including human free actions), there is no mystery how God, who both
knows and sustains the causal nexus, has foreknowledge of all events.4 God
knows what everyone will do in every possible situation. Nevertheless:
"Virtually all discussants of the foreknowledge issue agree that the problem
[of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom] is not
solved unless the solution preserves free will in a sense that is incompatible
with determinism."5 Since the truth of compatibilism would render these
philosophical problems vastly more tractable, it is surprising that Christians
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do not try to avail themselves of these obvious solutions by arguing for
compatibilism (Le., a compatibilist account of free will).
The second reason that the apparent Christian consensus on free will is
surprising is that there is a lot of room for the denial of libertarian accounts
in the Christian tradition, Roman Catholic as well as Protestant. Indeed, I
shall try to show that recent theories of free-will libertarianism conflict
with central Christian doctrines. In any case, large stretches of the writings
of St. Augustine, the most influential Christian theologian in the West, are
congenial to a compatibilist interpretation of free will. This is especially so
in Augustine's late anti-Pelagian works.6 Specifically, I want to show
that-on Augustine's view of grace-a libertarian account of free will is
irrelevant to salvation. On Augustine's view, the grace of God through
Christ is sufficient as well as necessary for salvation. Salvation is entirely in
the hands of God, totally independent of anything that any human being
might do. According to Augustine, we all deserve damnation, but God, in
His mercy, has selected some for salvation. God does not choose which
people to save on the basis of foreseeing any future merit on their part. He
simply predestines those He wants to save. There is no role for libertarian
construals of free will in the scheme of salvation. By contrast, Augustine's
opponent, Pelagius, at least as represented in Augustine's On Nature and
Grace, holds what today we would call a libertarian view of free will.
11. Three Christian Positions
Let me distinguish three Christian positions on free will and salvation.
(I) The grace of God through Christ is necessary and sufficient for
salvation. No act of will (construed in a libertarian way or not)
is needed for salvation.
(2) The grace of God through Christ is necessary for salvation, but
not sufficient. In addition, an act of free will, construed in a lib-
ertarian way, is also necessary for salvation.7
(3) The grace of God through Christ is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for righteousness needed for salvation. We must use our
free will (construed in a libertarian way) to take at least the first
steps toward salvation.
Augustine, in his later anti-Pelagian writings, and the Protestant reform-
ers endorsed (1). Indeed, Luther and Calvin made this position a center-
piece of the Reformation. As Luther vividly put it, "As for myself, I
frankly confess, that I should not want free will [as libertarians construe it]
to be given me, even if it could be, nor anything else be left in my own
hands to enable me to strive after my salvation."8 Even Thomas Aquinas
can be interpreted as holding something like (1). According to Th.omas
Flint, the 11core Thomist contention is that every contingent event and
proposition, including those involving free agents, is completely deter-
mined by God; my action, even if free, is still determined by God's action."9
By contrast, Molina and his followers endorse (2). Molina tried to show
how free will, on a libertarian construal, was compatible with divine provi-
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dence. According to Molinism, predestination is achieved by grace that is
"intrinsically sufficient" but only "extrinsically efficacious." 1f grace is only
extrinsically efficacious, then (though "intrinsically sufficient"), it is not
sufficient in the logical sense. In order to be sufficient in the logical sense,
on the Molinist account, grace must be met with consent in a libertarian
sense. I think that the distinction between "sufficient" and "efficacious"
grace is captured in our parlance by saying that grace is necessary but not
sufficient for salvation. lO
Finally, Pelagius (as represented by Augustine)l1 may be seen as endors-
ing (3). Sin can be avoided by human effort. Our God-given human
nature (which Pelagius calls 'grace') plus free will, as construed by libertar-
ians, suffices for righteousness.12 The grace of Christ is needed only "after
sin"-which is in our power to avoid.13 The possibility of not sinning is in
our natures; but whether we actually sin or not depends on our free wills,
construed in a libertarian way.14 On the contrary, "defending nature as if it
were sufficient to itself, provided only that the will be present, for the
attainment of righteousness, he [Pelagius] quite openly opposes the grace
of Christ, by which we are justified."15
Position (3), which seems to be Pelagius's, is not orthodox. Pelagius's
writings were condemned by various councils, and Pelagius himself was
finally excommunicated by Pope Zosimus in 418. I include the Pelagian
position, even though heretical, for two reasons. First, Pelagius wanted to
be an orthodox Christian. He was a moral reformer, who wanted to bring
Christians to higher levels of moral purity. He appealed to libertarian
understanding of free choice, which is not under the necessity of the rest of
nature, to emphasize our responsibility for our sins. Second, this position
is commonly endorsed in sermons and other forms of popular Christianity.
The Pelagian idea often takes a form like this: Using our own powers of
free will, we have the ability to choose to be righteous; and if we do so
choose, God will reward uso God's role is thought to be one of responding
to us when we turn to him on our own. So, despite the fact that (3) is offi-
cially a Christian heresy, it should be considered since many Christians
today seem to find it congenial.
III. The Human Condition
One does not have to have a literal interpretation of the story of Adam
and Eve in the Garden of Eden, approached by a serpent who offers a fatal
temptation, in order to take the doctrine of Original Sin seriously.
Although there are a number of versions of the doctrine of OriginalSin,161
shall focus on the characterization presented by Augustine in On Nature
and Grace. "[M]an was created sound and faultless, endowed with a free
will and a free ability to live a just life," but Adam's disobedience resulted
in a catastrophe for the human race. Adam's sin fatally weakened human
nature. Perhaps at creation, Adam had free will as libertarians construe it,
but the Fall destroyed it for Adam and his descendants. Augustine's view
is that we are born into astate of sinfulness and sickness, which only the
grace of God through Christ can heal.
A main difference between Pelagius and Augustine is that Pelagius
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believed that free will as libertarians construe it is required for sin, and
Augustine did not. Consider first Pelagius: "[H]ow can a man be answer-
able to God for the guilt of a sin which he knows is not his own? For if it is
necessary, it is not his own. Or if it is his own, it is voluntary, and if it is
voluntary, it can be avoided."17 Here (and elsewhere) Pelagius endorses
the view that we are responsible for an action only if we could have done
otherwise.
According to Augustine in On Nature and Grace, natural necessity is
compatible with will. Augustine takes issue with Pelagius, who declared,
"whatever is bound by natural necessity is not subject to the choice and
deliberation of the will." Augustine responds that "it is absurd to say that
it does not belong to our will that we want to be happy, simply because by
some good constraint in our nahIre, we are incapable of not wanting to be
happy." He adds: "Nor do we dare to say that God does not possess the
will but the necessity to be just, because he cannot want to sin."18
Moreover, not all sin is willed anyway. Sinful actions may be done in
ignorance.19 And one is responsible for the content of one's dreams. In
particular, a dream is sinful if (i) the dreamer is recipient of an evil sugges-
tion, and (ii) one takes pleasure in contemplating the evil act or thought
suggested, and (iii) one consents to it.20 Furthermore, the sinful state into
which one is born is independent of one's will altogether. Augustine had a
harsh doctrine of the unbaptized. An infant w110 died without the "bath of
regeneration" is "not admitted into the kingdom of heaven, even though
he not only was not a Christian but could not have been one."21 Similarly, a
man "who died in a place where he could not have heard the name of
Christ. ..[could not] have become just by his own nature and free will." To
say otherwise, "amounts to rendering the cross of Christ void."22
As I shall point out later, we can hold onto Augustine's view that not all
sin is a matter of will (libertarian or not), without supposing that the
unbaptized will be "justly condemned."23 On Augustine's view, we all
deserve etemal damnation, but some (the elect) are predestined by God for
salvation. I shall suggest that we retain the content of Augustine's doctrine
of grace and increase its scope.
Whereas Pelagius thought that Original Sin had no effect on our
natures/4 Augustine taught otherwise: Original Sin damaged, corrupted
our nature, and has left us with "the defect which darkens and weakens all
those natural goodS."25 This corruption can be remedied only by means of
the grace of Christ, which "is given gratuitously and not for our merits,
and for this reason it is called 'grace."'26 As a result of the Fall, on
Augustine's view, we do not 11ave free will as libertarians construe it with
respect to being righteous. As Paul said in Romans 7:19: "For the good that
I would, I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do." As Ltlther
argued in his debates with Erasmus, we do not have the power to do good
on our own.27
After arguing for the irrelevance of free will for salvation, and even for
faith, I want to raise questions about the viability of belief in a libertarian
conception of free will in two ways. First, I want to undermine some moti-
vations for belief in a libertarian conception of free will; then, I want to
examine arecent libertarian view of free will and show that it conflicts
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with traditional theism. I shall conclude with a comment about how to use
(part of) Augustine's view today.
IV. Grace as Gratuitous
According to traditional Christian belief in the West, no one is saved
without having been predestined to be saved. Not only is this Augustine's
view, but it is also Thomas Aquinas's. Moreover, predestinalion became a
central theme of the Reformation. The great reformers-Luther, Calvin,
Zwingli, Bucer, Beza, and later, Jonathan Edwards-believed that salvation
was gratuitous. Salvation was not a prize offered to those who lived a
good life. Nor does God predestine people for redemption on the basis of
His foreknowledge of their faith. (In his responses to Simplician,
Augustine explicitly repudiated this view, which he had held early on.)
As one writer vividly put it, by his later writings, Augustine "has come to
think that no one has adesire for God-not a scintilla of it-who has not
been predestined by God to have it."28
This view is grounded in Paul's letter to the Romans. To take a sampIe
passage: "For he [God] says to Moses, 'I will have mercy on whom I have
mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.' So it
depends not upon man's will or exertion, but upon God's mercy."29 By the
end of Romans 11, Paul has affirmed a doctrine of inscrutable election.3o
There is no room for free will as libertarians construe it in our salvation,
not even in the first step. In Predestination of the Saints/1 Augustine says:
God "brings it about that we begin to believe." Or again: "[I]n the elect, the
will is prepared by God."32 God's grace is gratuitous and is prior to our
faith. Augustine quotes over and over: "You have not chosen me, but I
have chosen yoU."33 As one scholar put it, according to Augustine, "salva-
tion is independent of man's fallen will; it is a matter of God's omnipo-
tence... .If God wishes a man's salvation, salvation follows of necessity."34 Or
again: "The effectiveness of God's mercy cannot be subject to any power of
man."35 Free will as construed by libertarians is thus excluded from the
process of salvation.
Indeed, God's action alone is necessary and sufficient for salvation. This
is a doctrine of objective atonement, according to which no (finite) will, lib-
ertarian or not, is required for salvation. Nevertheless, in this life, God
blesses some with faith, and faith involves one's will; but it still does not
involve free will as construed by libertarians.36 (Although some are grant-
ed faith in this life, others may be granted faith only eschatologically: "No
one cometh to the Father but by me" does not entail that all who come to
the Father know beforehand that they are coming through Christ, nor that
they even know that they are coming to the Father.) The desire to do
God's will and the desire to will what is good are effects, not causes, of
God's grace. Turning to God is indeed a matter of will, btlt the will is
caused by God to make the tum.37
In On the Predestination of the Saints, Augustine discusses John 6. He
asks, "What does 'Everyone that has heard from the Father, and has
learned, comes to me,' mean except that there is no one who hears from the
Father, and learns, and does not come to me [him]?"38 Not only is faith
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caused by God, but also God's action is irresistible. "Therefore, this grace,
which out of the divine generosity is bestowed secretly in human hearts, is
rejected by no one, no matter how hard-hearted he may be."39 If this grace
is "rejected by no one," then free will as libertarians construe it makes no
difference to whether or not a person has faith. On the one hand, anyone
on whom God so acts does come to have faith. On the other hand, without
God's causal action, no one comes to have faith. 50, the will needed for
faith is free will as compatibilists construe it.
I have been relying on Augustine's late, anti-Pelagian writings. In his
early works-for example, On the Free Choice of the Will-Augustine offers
what sounds like a libertarian view of free wil1.40 5tump says that
Augustine "does not repudiate his basic view .of the freedom of the will in
[On Free Choice] even during the Pelagian controversy."41 But in
Retractations, Augustine does say this: In On Free Choice, "concerning the
grace of God,...He has predestined His chosen ones in such a manner that
He Himself has even made ready the volitions of those whom He has already
endowed with free choice."42 It is difficult to see how God's making ready
volitions can be reconciled with free will as libertarians construe it.
In The City ofGod, moreover, Augustine implies a compatibilist constru-
al of free choices of the will: "Now if there is for God a fixed order of all
causes, it does not follow that nothing depends on our free choice. Our
wills themselves are in the order of causes, which is, for God, fixed and is
contained in his foreknowledge, since human acts of will are the causes of
human activities. Therefore, he who had prescience of the causes of all
events certainly could not be ignorant of our decisions, which he fore-
knows as the causes of our actions."43 So, our wills are contained in the
order of causes. The human acts of will that are OLlr free choices cause our
actions and are themselves in the order of causes.
Augustine continues: "Thus our wills have only as much power as God
has willed and foreknown; God, whose foreknowledge is infallible, has
foreknown the strength of our wills and their achievements, and it is for
this reason that their future strength is completely determined and their
future achievements utterly assured."44 Nevertheless, free will is a matter
of the will's willing what it does without coercion. This is clearly a nonlib-
ertarian understanding of the will.
To sum up: No finite will, on either a compatibilist or a libertarian con-
ception, has a causal role in bringing about salvation. However, the will
does playa role in one's coming to faith. But the will cannot come to faith
without God's causal action on it. 5ince God causes faith, the will involved
in faith is only a compatibilist will. Therefore, on Augustine's mature
view, free will as libertarians construe it is entirely irrelevant to salvation.
V. Free Will and Divine Causality
Not only is free will irrelevant to salvation from an Augustinian point of
view, but belief in a libertarian conception of free will directly conflicts
with Christian doctrine, nonAugustinian as well as Augustinian. 5uppose
that we divide exercises of the free will into three categories:
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(A) Willing what is good----e.g., to love God;
(B) Willing what is evil----e.g., to hate God or to harm one's neigh-
bor;
(C) Willing what is morally neutral----e.g., to accept an offer of a job
that is not immoral.
According to orthodox Christian doctrine, every act of will in category
(A) requires that God cause the disposition of the will. In order for some-
one to will what is good, God must move the will: God must cause the
will to will what is good; the will cannot will what is good on its own.
This is Augustine's view, and it is also Thomas Aquinas's: God directly
causes a person to will what is goOd.45 Martin Luther also insists that only
God can cause us to will what is good.46 These writers may differ in how
they understand God's causal powers, but they all agree that God causes a
good will. Both premises of the following simple valid argument are mat-
ters of orthodox Christian doctrine:
(1) No human being wills what is good unless God causes her to
will what is good.
(2) 50me human beings will what is good.
(3) God causes some human beings to will what is good.
The hallmark of free will as libertarians construe it is that its exercise is
uncaused by anything over which the agent has no control. Therefore, a
will whose exercise is caused by God is, by definition, not a free will as liber-
tarians construe it. Given premise (I), a human being makes a contribution
to willing what is good, but not a contribution independent of God. Not
only does premise (1) conflict with Pelagianism, but it also conflicts with
Molinism, with "synergism,"47 and with any other view that requires free
will as libertarians construe it. If God causes a person to will what is good, it
is not within her power to refrain from willing (in the libertarian way) what
is good. 50, category (A) excludes libertarian free will.48 Nevertheless, cate-
gory (A) does not exclude free will as compatibilists construe it.
Consider a compatibilist conception free will. 5ay that to will X is to
have an effective desire to choose or do X, adesire that moves one to
choose or to do X.49 If one has the will that she wants to have (if, that is,
one is moved by the desire that she wants to move one), then one has free
will as a compatibilist may construe it. In detail:
(CFW) A person 5 has compatibilist free will for a choice or action if:
(i) 5 wills X,
(ii) 5 wants to will X,
(iii) 5 wills X because she wants to will X, and
(iv) 5 would still have willed X even if she (herself) had
known the provenance of her wanting to will X.
Thus, according to (CFW), a person freely wills what is good-to love God,
say-if (i) she wills to love God; (ii) she wants to will to love God; (iii) she
wills to love God because she wants to will to love God; and (iv) even she
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knew the proven.ance of her wanting to will to love God-namely, that her
wanting to will to love God was caused by God Himself-she would still
want to will to love God. There is no conflict between free will on a com-
patibilist conception and the doctrine that God causes a good will.
So, orthodox Christians should be committed to free will as compati-
bilists construe it in instances of category (A). Now either God plays the
same causal role with respect to all three categories or He does not. If He
does, then it immediately follows that compatibilism holds throughout.50
If He does not, we should still affirm compatibilism. Consider this possi-
bility more closely: Some theologians (Thomas Aquinas, for example) hold
that, whereas God causes good acts, He only permits evil acts. (Such the-
ologians want to avoid saying that God causes some people to will what is
evil.) Let us put aside qualms that, for an omnipotent and omniscient
Being, the distinction between causing (or intending) and permitting (or
allowing) is a distinction without a difference. To say that God's causal role
in category-(B) cases differs from His causal role in category-(A) cases is
not to deny Hirn a causal role in category-(B) cases altogether. Indeed,
since orthodox Cmistians are already committed to compatibilist free will
for category (A), it is reasonable to suppose that all free will is of the com-
patibilist variety.
The theologically important distinction between category (A) and cate-
gory (B) can be made within the realms of causality-that is, internal to free
will as compatibilists construe it: Category-(A) exercises of the will are
caused by God; category-(B) exercises of the will and category-(C) exercises
of the will (if any) are not caused by God in the same way as category-(A)
exercises of the will. But category-{B) and category-{C) exercises of the will
still have natural causes, and God, who sustains natural causes, will still
have some causal role. (The person with free will as compatibilists con-
strue it is morally responsible for the exercises of her will in all three cate-
gories, as I shall indicate in the next section.) Given that the will must be
understood as compatibilist in category-{A) exercises, it seems of dubious
coherence to suppose that the will is not to be understood as compatibilist
in category-(B) and category-(C) exercises. Compatibilism (in the relevant
sense) is the view that the will can be free and caused; it is not a view that
distinguish.es between natural and supernatural causes.
The challenge to libertarians from divine causality can be seen from
another angle. The basic intuition of libertarianism is that the free agent is the
ultimate source or originator of her choices and / or actions. Every exercise of
libertarian free will requires an initiation of a new causal chain, with no
causal antecedents beyond the agent's contro!. Either the agent causes an
event that has no antecedent event as a cause (agent-causation), or there is an
event in the agent's rnind or brain that itself has no antecedent cause at all
(event-causation).51
Until recently, there have not been detailed accounts of how libertarian-
ism is supposed to work. (Many libertarians have been content to state the
view in general terms of power to choose and to refrain from choosing,
and then to argue against compatibilism.) But now we have some deeper
accounts of libertarianism. One of the most sophisticated is Robert Kane's,
which I shall use as an exemplary libertarian view. Free will, in the sense
WHY CHRISTIANS SHOULD NOT BE LIBERTARIANS 469
that concems Kane, is "the power of agents to be the ultimate creators (or
originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes."52 The notion of
'ultimacy' is extremely strong:
[W]hen we trace the causal or explanatory chains of action back to
their sources in the purposes of free agents, these causal chains must
come to an end or terminate in the willings (choices, decisions, or
efforts) of the agents, which cause or bring about their purposes. If
these willings were in turn caused by something else, so that the
explanatory chains could be traced back further to heredity or envi-
ronment, to God, or fate, then the ultimacy would not lie with the
agents but with something else.53
So a libertarian construal of free will, along with moral responsibility,
requires that the agent be the ultimate source of the choice or action in an
extremely strong way. All the factors that produce the choice or action
must be within the agent's contro!. Otherwise, according to Robert Kane,
"the action, or the agent's will to perform it, would have its source in some-
thing the agent played no role in producing. Then the arche [sufficient
ground or cause or explanation] of the action, or of the agent's will to per-
form it, would not be 'in the agent,' but in something else."54
"[T]o will freely, in this traditional sense," Kane says, "is to be the ulti-
mate creator (prime mover, so to speak) of your own purposes."55 Roderick
Chisholm, a proponent of agent-causation, put it this way:
If we are responsible, and if what I have been trying to say is true,
then we have a prerogative which some would attribute only to God:
each ofus, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do,
we cause certain events to happen, and nothing-or no one-causes
us to cause those events to happen.56
If we are prime movers unmoved, then it is difficult to see how God (or any-
thing else beyond our control) could have any influence over our free acts.
In her discussion of Augustine on free will, Eleonore Stump gives a simi-
lar necessary condition: "[A]n agent acts with free will, or is morally
responsible for an act, only if her own intellect and will are the sole Ltltimate
source or first cause of her act."57 Stump appends several notes to clarify
this necessary condition, one of which seems to indicate that she sees the
tension between libertarian free will and Christian doctrine. She says,
"Insofar as God is the creator of every created thing and insofar as any cre-
ated cause is always dependent on the operation of divine causality, no cre-
ated thing can ever be the sole cause of anything, or the ultimate first cause
of anything."58 From this remark, together with the condition that one has
free will "only if her own intellect and will are the sole ultimate source or
first cause of her act," the obvious inference is that no created thing has free
will (as libertarians construe it). But Stump does not draw that inference.
Why not? She continues: "What is at issue for Augustine on free will and
grace, however, is whether God is also the cause of the will in some
stronger sense than this. And so for the sake of simplicity in this paper, I
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am simply bracketing the operations of God as first cause and creator."59
But if we are talking about general conditions for free will, we cannot
bracket the operations of God as first cause and creator. (And I doubt that
Augustine would permit such bracketing anyway.) No particularly strong
sense in which God is the cause of the will is needed in order for there to
be a conflict between a libertarian conception of free will and Christian
doctrine. The conflict is a matter of deductive logic. If (i) "no created thing
can ever be the sole cause of anything, or the ultimate first cause of any-
thing," as Stump says, and (ii) human persons are created things, then it
follows that (iii) human persons are not the ultimate first causes of any-
thing. In that case, human persons do not have free will as libertarians
construe it. Period. This is a straightforward inference that depends only
on the libertarian conception of our being the ultimate sources or first caus-
es of our choices and actions. It does not require appeal to a notion of God
as the cause of the will in some specially strong sense.60 A will that is
"always dependent on the operation of divine causality" can not be free in
a libertarian way at all. Gf course, a free will could be "always dependent
on the operation of divine causality," but such a conception of free will
would be compatibilist, not libertarian.
Granted, Kane and Chisholm are not writing as Christian philosophers,
and perhaps Christian libertarians can work out the details of an account
that both captures the libertarian intuition and is compatible with divine
causality.61 Simply to say that one has libertarian free will if one has the
power to choose A and the power to refrain from choosing A at the
moment of choosing (or not choosing) is just not enough. The challenge is
to reconcile libertarian free will with divine causality.
VI. Motivations for Belief in Libertarian Free Will
As we saw at the beginning, there is a philosophical Christian consensus
in favor of a libertarian conception of free will. Since, on nontheological
grounds, I believe that the notion of libertarian free will is wholly unten-
able today,62 I believe that the Christian consensus is in error: Given what
is known about the physical world today, I do not believe that we can
make sense of libertarian free will in any detail in a way that allows us to
be the ultimate sources or originators in the intended sense of our actions.
If there is no such thing as free will as libertarians construe it, Christians
should join the mature Augustine and argue for Christianity without a lib-
ertarian view of free will. ladmit that there are some strong motivations
for defending free will as libertarians construe it. I shall consider, briefly,
four of these motivations for defending a libertarian conception of free will,
and at least gesture toward considerations that undermine them.
(1) Free will as libertarians construe it has been thought to be required
for moral responsibility. There is a long tradition of philosophers who
believe both that all events, even the exercises of free will, are caused and
also that on some occasions, we are morally responsible for what we do.
Augustine himself held human beings morally responsible for their sins,
on the (compatibilist) grounds that they sin willingly. If sinning willingly
suffices for moral responsibility for sin, then moral responsibility is com-
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patible with being caused. This is well-turned soil. Let me just baldly
restate the conditions for a compatibilist conception of free will, and offer
them as sufficient conditions for moral responsibility: A person 5 is moral-
ly responsible for willing an action X if: (i) 5 wills X, (ii) 5 wants to will X,
(iii) 5 wills X because she wants to will X, and (iv) 5 would still have willed
X even if she had known the provenance of her wanting to will
X.63Although I cannot defend the sufficiency of these conditions for moral
responsibility here, let me just illustrate them:
A man named Bobby Frank Cherry was recently convicted in the bomb-
ing that killed four black 5unday-5chool girls in the church in Birmingham
in 1963. 5uppose that Cherry (i) willed to participate in the bombing. As a
convinced white supremacist (who apparently bragged of his participa-
tion), he (ii) wanted to will to participate, and he (iii) willed to participate
because he wanted to. He (iv) would still be proud of his participation,
and would participate again, even if he knew that his willing to participate
in the bombing had been caused by his racist upbringing. ("Damn right,"
he might have said, /land I'm bringing up my boys the same way.") It
seems to me obvious that he was morally responsible for his participation
in the bombing. He was moved by the desire (to bomb the black church)
that he wanted to be moved by.
The conditions (i) - (iv) are clearly compatible with the will's being
caused. 50, if, as I shall argue elsewhere, the four conditions are sufficient
for moral responsibility, then libertarian free will is not needed for moral
responsibility.64
(2) A related motivation for libertarian free will is that without it, we
may be just puppets. It seems obvious to me that a person who satisfies (i)
- (iv) is not just a puppet. We would be puppets if our actions had causes
that by-passed our deliberations and choices and decision-making process-
es. But if we act on the basis of choices made for reasons that we want to
have-and we know how we came to have these reasons-we are not pup-
pets. 5uch actions are expressions of the person that one is--{)f her charac-
ter, whether the actions are caused by factors outside her control or not. If
she is satisfied with being that kind of person, she is morally responsible
for such actions. No free will as libertarians construe it is necessary.
(3) Another motivation for Christian belief in libertarian free will comes
from its use in addressing the problem of evil. Thus, Plantinga (1974) has
mounted a famous "Free Will Defense" against the logical problem of evil.
There are reasons, however, not to follow this route: (i) The pay-off for
appeal to libertarian free will is very slight. At most, appeal to free will as
libertarians construe it shows that there is no logical inconsistency between
the goodness of God and the (bare) existence of moral evil. This does not
begin to allay worries about evil and suffering and the untoward vagaries
of life. It does not even touch the problem of natural evil-----€arthquakes,
birth defects and other sources of suffering.65 (ii) Witl'l or without libertarian
free will, evil is and remains inscrutable. On considering great and unde-
served suffering, we have to fall back on our faith anyway.66 We are already
saddled with the mystery of the distribution and amount of both moral and
physical evi1; adding faith that there is no logical inconsistency between the
existence of God and the (bare) existence of evil at all does not seem much
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of a stretch. So, we mayas weIl not compromise the traditional
Augustinian view of grace by appeal to a libertarian conception of free will.
(4) The principle of 'ought' implies 'can' appeals to many, and may be
thought to entail a libertarian conception of free will. Gareth Matthews has
pointed out that the principle-If x ought to do A, then x can do A-may
mean either of two things:67
(i) If x ought to do A, then x can do A independently of God's
grace.
(ii) If x ought to do A, then x can do A, though perhaps only with
the grace of God.
If interpreted as (i), the '" ought' implies 'can'" principle is the Pelagian
heresy, and orthodox Christians ought to reject it. If interpreted as (ii), the
principle is acceptable; but so interpreted, it does not require free will of a
libertarian sort. So, the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' should be dis-
carded as a motivation for orthodox Christians to accept a libertarian view
of free will.
These motivations are the only ones that I know of for belief in free will
as libertarians construe it. Although I have not been able to do justice here
to the motivations for belief in a libertarian conception of free will, they all
seem to me faulty in the ways that I have suggested.
VII. AugustineJor Christians Today
Modern thinkers find Augustinian (and Thomistic) doctrines of Original
Sin and Predestination unpalatable, and have largely abandoned the
Augustinian doctrines of grace. I recommend a different strategy, one that
avoids watering down the central tenets of the faith. First, distinguish two
aspects of each doctrine: (a) its content, what it claims to be the case, and
(b) its scope of application, the group to whom it is to apply. For example,
the content of the doctrine of Original Sin is that we have a moral flaw that
cannot be mended by our own powers; the scope of the doctrine is univer-
sal: It applies to everyone, with the exception of Jesus, and, in the Roman
Catholic tradition, of Mary-though in a different way.
With the distinction between content and scope, we can keep the
Augustinian doctrines in their severity, but change their scope. Although
Augustine himself believed that only a few are saved, we can consider the
possibility of universal salvation, perhaps after periods of various lengths
of purgation. This strategy would retain moral responsibility and
Judgment, but deny that Judgment must issue in eternal damnation for
anyone. We simply do not know, nor need we worry about, who is to be
saved. The matter of salvation is totally under the control of God, who is
essentially Good. Hut the possibility of universal salvation does render the
difficult doctrines of Original Sin and Predestination more acceptable,
without compromising the content of ancient Christian belief. We can
even accept the Augustinian view that we all deserve etemal damnation,
Iland that it is only by God's grace that any of us is saved. My suggestion is
Inot to dilute Augustinian doctrine of grace, but to embrace its content
WHY CHRISTIANS SHOULD NOT BE LIBERTARIANS 473
fully, while only expanding its scope.
Although Augustine and his followers clearly did not believe in univer-
sal salvation, there is Pauline support for it: /lGod wills that all men should
be saved."68 Augustine himself interpreted this text-quite implausibly-as
lall who are saved are saved through God's will.'69 But a face-value reading
of the text, together with apremise that /lGod cannot will in vain anything
that he has willed,"70 implies universalism. In addition, there is a rninority
tradition of Christians who accept the possibility of universalism.71
Moreover, universalism allows us to retain the absolute truth of
Christianity without its intolerance. We are equally sinners and equally
dependent on God's mercy-Christians and nonChristians alike. We
know that most people who profess to speak for God do not speak for
I-lim: They are mistaken or self-deceived. (We know this because they
contradict each other, and God's will does not contradict itself.) And
for all that we know, many nonbelievers do speak for God. (God works
through nonbelievers as weIl as through believers.) To say that all are
ultimately saved through Christ is not to say that they do anything at all
for their salvation, or even that they know that they are saved through
Christ. (Perhaps it is revealed to everyone on the day of Judgment that
they are saved through Christ.) Whether universalism is true or not, our
salvation is in God's hands, period. The doctrine of God's sovereignty
over the universe entails that He can save anyone whom He wants to
save.
VIII. Conclusion
Despite the contemporary Christian consensus in favor of a libertarian
view of free will, a compatibilist view of free will and moral responsibility
is to be preferred. I have tried to make only the theological case against
free-will libertarianism here. (The nontheological case against libertarian
free will is ably made by Derk Pereboom in Living Without Free Will.)72The
distinctively philosophical issue that compatibilist views on free will raise is
the same whether our choices and actions are caused by God or by natural
causes, and I believe that the philosophical objections can be met by a com-
patibilist who endorses the four conditions in (CFW).
Relying primarily on Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings, my aim has
been to show that Christians should not believe in a libertarian concep-
tion of free will, for the following reasons: (i) Free will is irrelevant to
salvation. (ii) The will needed for faith is not libertarian. (iii) Moral
responsibility does not require free will of a libertarian sort. (iv) On the
assumption that any Christian view shared by Augustine, Aquinas and
Luther is part of Christian orthodoxy, the most articulated libertarian
views free will-the views that take people to be the sole first causes, or
ultimate sources, of their choices and actions-conflict with Christian
orthodoxy.73
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